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The current literature offers two views on the nature of the income process. Ac-
cording to the ﬁrst view, which we call the “Restricted Income Proﬁles” (RIP) model
(MaCurdy, 1982), individuals are subject to large and very persistent shocks, while
facing similar life-cycle income proﬁles (conditional on a few characteristics). Accord-
ing to the alternative view, which we call the “Heterogeneous Income Proﬁles” (HIP)
model (Lillard and Weiss, 1979), individuals are subject to income shocks with mod-
est persistence, while facing individual-speciﬁc income proﬁles. In this paper, we ﬁrst
show that ignoring proﬁle heterogeneity, when in fact it is present, introduces an up-
ward bias into the estimates of persistence. Second, we estimate a parsimonious pa-
rameterization of the HIP model that is suitable for calibrating economic models. The
estimated persistence is about 0.8 in the HIP model compared to about 0.99 in the RIP
model. Moreover, the heterogeneity in income proﬁles is estimated to be substantial,
explaining between 65 to 80 percent of income inequality at the time of retirement. We
also analyze the differences in the income process by education and ﬁnd that proﬁle
heterogeneity is signiﬁcantly larger among higher educated individuals. Finally we
show that the main evidence against proﬁle heterogeneity in the existing literature—
that the autocorrelations of income changes are small and negative—is also replicated
by the HIP model, casting doubt on the previous interpretation of this evidence.
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11 Introduction
When markets are incomplete, labor income risk plays a central role in many decisions
that individuals make. Understanding the nature of income risk is thus an essential pre-
requisite for understanding a wide range of economic questions, such as the determina-
tion of wealth inequality (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995; Huggett, 1996), life-cycle
consumption behavior (Carroll and Samwick, 1997; Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Guve-
nen, 2005), the welfare costs of business cycles (Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2001; Lu-
cas, 2003), and the determination of asset prices (Constantinides and Dufﬁe, 1996), among
others. The conclusions one reaches in these analyses clearly depend on the properties of
the labor income process used to calibrate these models.
The current literature offers two views on the nature of the income process. To provide
context for the following discussion, suppose that the log income of individual i with h
years of labor market experience is given by:1
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where βi is the individual-speciﬁc income growth rate with cross-sectional variance σ2
β;
and ηi
h is the innovation to the AR(1) process with variance σ2
η. In this preliminary dis-
cussion we abstract from heterogeneity in the intercept of income.
The early papers on income dynamics estimated versions of the process given in (1)
from labor income data and found ρ ￿ 1 and σ2
β ￿ 0 (Lillard and Weiss, 1979; Hause,
1980; and more recently Baker, 1997; and Haider, 2001). Thus according to this ﬁrst view,
which we call the “Heterogeneous Income Proﬁles” (HIP) model, individuals are sub-
ject to shocks with modest persistence, while facing lifecycle proﬁles that are individual-
speciﬁc (and hence vary signiﬁcantly across the population). One theoretical motivation
for this speciﬁcation is the human capital model, which implies differences in income
proﬁles, for example, if individuals differ in their ability level (Becker, 1965; Ben-Porath,
1967).
In an inﬂuential paper, MaCurdy (1982) cast doubt on these ﬁndings. He tested—and
did not reject—the restrictionσ2
β = 0 against the more general alternative of HIP. He then
1This income process is a substantially simpliﬁed version of the models estimated in the literature, but
still captures the components necessary for the present discussion. We study more general processes in
Section 2.
2estimated versions of the income process given in (1) by imposingσ2
β ￿ 0, and foundρ ￿ 1
(see also Abowd and Card, 1989; Topel, 1990; and Topel and Ward 1992).2 Thus, according
to this alternative view, which we call the “Restricted Income Proﬁles” (RIP) model, in-
dividuals are subject to extremely persistent—nearly random walk—shocks, while facing
similar life-cycle income proﬁles.
In this paper, we examine labor income data from several angles to help distinguish
between these two income processes. We begin our analysis by showing that ignoring
the heterogeneity in income growth rates (as is done in the RIP model), when in fact it
is present, biases the estimated persistence parameter upward. It is easy to see why this
happens: an individual with high (alternatively, low) income growth rate will systemati-
cally deviate from the average proﬁle. Ignoring this fact will then lead the econometrician
to interpret this systematic fanning out as the result of persistent positive (or negative) in-
come shocks every period.
We study an example to show that this bias can be substantial: when labor income is
generated from the HIP process given above with i.i.d shocks (equation (1)), the persis-
tence parameter is estimated to be about 0.90 if RIP is assumed, instead of the true value
of zero. This example thus suggests that allowing for heterogeneity in income growth
rates is critical for the consistent estimation of the persistence parameter. It also explains
why the previous studies estimating RIP models always obtained persistence parameters
much higher than those implied by their HIP counterparts. In section 2.4 we also discuss
more generally which features of labor income data allow us to distinguish between the
RIP and HIP models.
We next estimate the HIP and RIP versions of a general labor income process. The sto-
chastic component of the income process has typically been modeled in one of two ways
in the literature. Following MaCurdy (1982), several studies have modeled the dynam-
ics with an ARMA(1,1) or (1,2) process (among others, Abowd and Card, 1989; Meghir
and Pistaferri, 2004). While this speciﬁcation is quite ﬂexible and provides a good de-
scription of income dynamics, it has one obvious drawback when used as input into an
economic model: the ARMA(1,1) process requires two state variables (the values of the
AR and MA innovations) and the ARMA(1,2) requires three state variables to form opti-
mal forecasts of the income process. Consequently, the majority of the existing life-cycle
(or overlapping generations) models are instead calibrated using an income process fea-
2It is then curious that the conclusion reached by MaCurdy’s test seems to contradict the direct estima-
tion evidence supporting the HIP model. We discuss this point below.
3turing an AR(1) component plus a transitory shock (among many others, Hubbard et
al., 1995; Huggett, 1996; Campbell et al., 2001; Storesletten et al., 2004; Heathcote et al.,
2004). This speciﬁcation introduces only one state variable into a dynamic programming
problem, and provides a good compromise between ﬁt and parsimony. However, the
existing estimates of the HIP process in the literature also feature either an ARMA(1,1)
or (1,2) process.3 Thus, a second contribution of this paper is to estimate a HIP process,
where the stochastic component is modeled parsimoniously as an AR(1) process plus a
transitory shock, making it suitable as a basis for calibration.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) covering 1968 to 1993,
we ﬁnd statistically and quantitatively signiﬁcant heterogeneity in income proﬁles. Fur-
thermore, the persistence of income shocks is estimated to be about 0.8 in the HIP model
compared to about 0.99 when RIP is imposed. Together, these estimates imply that be-
tween 65 to 80 percent of income inequality at the age of retirement is due to heteroge-
neous proﬁles.
Third, we examine the differences in the income processes across education groups.
While several studies have investigated this question in the context of RIP models (Hub-
bard et al., 1994; Carroll and Samwick, 1997), there exists no corresponding analysis in
the context of HIP models. We ﬁnd that in the HIP model the persistence parameter and
innovation variance is very similar across education groups, but there is a major differ-
ence in a key dimension: the dispersion of income growth rates,σ2
β, is more than twice as
large for college graduates than it is for high school graduates. This is in contrast to the
estimates from the RIP model, which implies similar income processes for both groups,
with some mild evidence of larger innovation variances for lower educated individuals.
Fourth, we try to reconcile the test used by MaCurdy and others which does not reject
the RIP model, with the direct estimation results which support the HIP model. In related
work, Baker (1997) has conducted a careful Monte Carlo study and argued that the test
lacks power in small sample against the alternative of HIP. Here we emphasize a different
point that applies even in large sample, where inﬂated size or low power are not relevant.
We argue that the tests used by MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and Card (1989) are not valid
if the alternative hypothesis is a stochastic process (such as HIP) that contains an AR(1)
3Baker experiments with an AR(1) process to provide a comparison to Lillard and Weiss (1979). But as is
well-known classical measurement error biases estimates of persistence downward when transitory shocks
are not allowed.








η] for n ￿ 2
Notice that the term in brackets vanishes as n gets large, so higher order autocovari-
ances of income changes must be positive if indeed σ2
β > 0. This observation forms the
basis of MaCurdy’s test. A key question however is, What is the lowest lag at which the
covariances should become positive? This is important because the aforementioned stud-
ies have focused on the ﬁrst 5 to 10 lags. By substituting the parameter values estimated
in Section 3 into the expression above, one can easily show that in the HIP model the
ﬁrst 11 covariances will be negative (see ﬁgure 6), despite the fact that those estimates
imply substantial heterogeneity in income proﬁles. This point suggests that the negative
covariances of income changes reported in the literature is exactly what is implied by the
HIP model. In Section 4 we show that the autocovariance and autocorrelation structures
generated by the estimated HIP model are also quantitatively similar to their empirical
counterparts. These results cast doubt on the previous interpretation of this evidence in
the literature as supporting the RIP model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
and the estimation method. Section 3 presents the empirical results and quantiﬁes the
heterogeneity in income growth rates. Section 4 reconciles the direct estimation evidence
with earlier tests implemented in the literature, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 The PSID Data
This section brieﬂy describes the data and the variables used in the empirical analysis.
The labor earnings data are drawn from the ﬁrst 26 waves of PSID covering the period
from 1968 to 1993. Our main sample consists of male head of households between the
ages of 22 and 62. We include an individual into the sample if he satisﬁes the following
conditions for twenty (not necessarily consecutive) years: the individual has (1) reported
positive labor earnings and hours; (2) worked between 520 and 5110 hours in a given
year; (3) had an average hourly earnings between a preset minimum and a maximum
wage rate (to ﬁlter out extreme observations). We also exclude individuals who belong
5to the poverty (SEO) subsample in 1968. These criteria are similar to the ones used in
previous studies (Abowd and Card, 1989; Baker, 1997; and Heathcote et al., 2004, among
others).
These criteria leave us with our main sample of 1270 individuals with at least twenty
years of data on each. To study the labor income processes of different education groups
separately, we further draw two subsamples: the ﬁrst contains 335 individuals with at
least a four-year college degree (sixteen years of education or more), and the second con-
tains 882 individuals with at most a high school degree (ﬁfteen years of education or less).
To make the text more readable, we will refer to the former group as “college-educated”
and the latter as “high school educated,” at the expense of a slight abuse of language.
The measure of labor income includes wage income, bonuses, commissions, plus the la-
bor portions of several types of income such as farm income, business income, etc. Labor
income in PSID refers to the previous year, so our data covers 1967-92. The (potential)
labor market experience of an individual is deﬁned as h = (age￿max(years of schooling,
12) ￿ 6). Further details of the selection criteria, variable deﬁnitions and some summary
statistics for the primary sample are contained in Appendix A.
2.2 A Statistical Model
The process for log earnings, e yh
it, of individual i with h years of labor market experience in
















where i = 1,.., I ; h = 1,.., H, and t = 1,.., T.
The functions g and f denote the “life-cycle” components of earnings. The ﬁrst one, g,
captures the part of variation that is common to all individuals (hence the coefﬁcient vec-
torθ0
t is not individual-speciﬁc) and is assumed to be a cubic polynomial in experience, h.
Notice that the coefﬁcients of this polynomial are allowed to be time-varying. In addition
to the standard time effects (aggregate shocks) in labor income movements captured by
year-to-year variations in the intercept of g, this ﬂexible speciﬁcation also allows us to
model some important changes that took place in the labor market during our sample pe-
riod. For example, changes in the return to experience that took place during this period
(Katz and Autor, 1999) are accounted for by the time-varying higher order terms in expe-
rience. Although, it is also possible to capture the rise in the skill premium during this
period (Katz and Murphy, 1992) by adding an education dummy into g, we do not pur-
6sue this approach in the baseline speciﬁcation (Instead we capture all the cross-sectional
variation in income growth rate in f). Later in the paper, we will allow for a separate
income process for each education group to fully control for the effect of education on the
life-cycle proﬁles as well as its effect on the persistence and variance of income shocks.
The second function, f, is the centerpiece of our analysis, and captures the component
of life-cycle earnings that is individual- or group-speciﬁc. For example, if the growth
rate of earnings varies with the ability of a worker, or is different across occupations, this
variation will be reﬂected in an individual- or occupation-speciﬁc slope coefﬁcient in f.





= αi + βih, where the




is distributed across individuals with zero mean, variances
ofσ2
α andσ2
β, and covariance ofσαβ.4
Although it is straightforward to generalize f to allow for heterogeneity in higher
order terms, Baker (1997, p. 373) ﬁnds that this extension does not noticeably affect para-
meter estimates or improve the ﬁt of the model. In addition, recall that one goal of this
study is to estimate an income process that is parsimonious enough to be used for cal-
ibrating macroeconomic models. However, each additional term introduced into f will
appear as an additional state variable in a dynamic programming problem (see, for ex-
ample, Guvenen, 2005). The current speciﬁcation provides a reasonable trade-off for this
purpose.5
Modeling the Dynamics of Income.—The stochastic component of income is modeled as
an AR(1) process plus a purely transitory shock. This speciﬁcation is fairly common in the
literatureand, despiteitsparsimoniousstructure, itappearstoprovideagooddescription
of income dynamics in the data (Topel, 1990; Hubbard et al., 1994; Mofﬁtt and Gottschalk,
1995; Storesletten et al., 2004).6 The AR(1) process can capture mean-reverting shocks,
such as human capital innovations that depreciate over time, or long-term nominal wage
contractswhosevaluedecreasesovertimeinrealterms, aswellasfullypermanentshocks
as a special case. Second, there have been some signiﬁcant changes in the sizes of both
persistent and transitory income shocks over the sample period under study (c.f., Mofﬁtt
4The zero-mean assumption is merely a normalization since g already includes an intercept and a linear
term. Thus, in any given year, the population averages of the intercept and slope are given by the ﬁrst two
coefﬁcients of g.
5Lillard and Reville (1999) on the other hand, provide some evidence suggesting that the quadratic term
may be important so this seems to be an extension worth considering in future work.
6As noted earlier, although it is also possible to model dynamics using an unrestricted ARMA (1,1) or
(1,2) process, the resulting speciﬁcation introduces additional state variables into dynamic programming
problems, making it unsuitable for our purposes.
7and Gottschalk, 1995; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). To capture this non-stationarity, we
write zh






where πt captures possible time-variation in the innovation variance. Similarly, the tran-
sitory shock in equation (2),εh
it, is scaled by φt to account for possible non-stationarity in
that component. The innovations ηh
it andεh
it are assumed to be independent of each other
and over time (and independent ofαi andβi), with zero mean, and variances ofσ2
η andσ2
ε
respectively. Furthermore, measurement error is a pervasive problem in micro data sets,
and income data in PSID is no exception. This measurement error will be captured in the
transitory component if it is serially independent, or will be included in zh
it if it has an
autoregressive component (Bound and Krueger, 1991). It is important to keep this point
in mind when interpreting the empirical ﬁndings in the next section.
The income residual, yh
it, is obtained by regressing e yh
it on the polynomial g. Since the
individual-speciﬁc parameters, αi and βi, are not observable, f is treated as part of the
random component of the income process and is included in the residual. For a given








































































η, t > 1,h > 1
Note that in the ﬁrst line we implicitly assume that the initial value of the persistent
shock is zero for all individuals. In the second line we assume that the innovation vari-
ance was constant over time before the sample started in 1968, so that the cross-sectional
variance for a cohort aged h in the ﬁrst year of the sample can be determined by the
8Figure 1: Ignoring Proﬁle Heterogeneity Results in an Upward Bias in Estimated Persis-
tence
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Individual with high (b
H) earnings growth rate
Individual with low (b
L) earnings growth rate
accumulated effect over the last h years.
Our estimation strategy is based on minimizing the “distance” between the elements
of the (T ￿ T) empirical covariance matrix of income residuals (denote it by C) and its
counterpart implied by the statistical model described above (Chamberlain (1984)). A







individuals of all ages who were present in these two years. The theoretical counterpart
is calculated by aggregating over h the formulas for the covariances given in (3) for each
(h,t) cell. This estimation method has been used extensively in the literature (including
most of the studies referenced in this paper), so it is familiar enough that we relegate its
details (including the choice of weighting matrix, the exact formulas used, and related
issues) to Appendix B.
2.3 Proﬁle Heterogeneity and the Estimates of Persistence
Before proceeding further, we show that restricting income proﬁles across the population
(as in the RIP model), when in fact such heterogeneity is present, leads to inconsistent
estimates of the persistence parameter. To see this point, consider two individuals with
different income growth rates, βH > βL, whose income proﬁles are plotted in ﬁgure
1. Clearly, the income paths of both of these individuals will deviate from the average
9proﬁle (denoted with “-^”) in a systematic way over time. Ignoring this fact (by assuming
βH = βL ￿ β) will then lead the econometrician to interpret this systematic fanning out
as the result of a sequence of persistent positive (or negative) income shocks to these
individuals (indicated by the up and down arrows in the ﬁgure.)
The resulting bias can be substantial as can be seen in the following example. Con-
sider a simpliﬁed version of the income process given in (2): e yh
it = αi +βih+εh
it, where βi
has mean β, andεh
it is serially independent with zero mean. In addition, suppose that the
econometrician allows for a ﬁxed effect in the intercept, but not in the growth rates (as-
suming a life-cycle proﬁle ofαi +βh for all individuals). In this case, the income residuals
are:
yh











It easy to see that yh
it does not have zero mean for a given individual over time; instead
it will either trend up or down. Finally, suppose that the econometrician observes a single
cohort, and only when they are h and h + 1 years old (we relax this assumption below).
Then, under the (incorrect) assumption of RIP, a consistent estimator of the persistence of

















Notice that b ρ is increasing in h, and approaches 1 in the limit, when in fact the true
persistence is zero. To get a quantitative sense of the potential bias, we substitute some
plausible values (that is, values consistent with our estimates in the next section) into this
formula: σ2
β = 0.0004, and σ2
ε = 0.03. If the observed cohort is 44 years old (h = 20)
the estimated persistence is b ρ = 0.87. Similarly, if h = 30, one obtains b ρ = 0.95. This
calculation can be easily extended to show that when there is a population of individuals
uniformly distributed from 25 to 64 years of age (h = 1 to 40), the estimated persistence
would be b ρ = 0.91, even though the true persistence is, again, zero.
Furthermore, since this bias arises from heterogeneity in growth rates, the fact that we
accounted for ﬁxed effects in levels—as is commonly done in the literature—had no miti-
gating effects. In other words, if we also restrict αi across individuals in the calculations
above, the corresponding values of b ρ remain almost unchanged. This simple example
illustrates the close link between proﬁle heterogeneity and the estimated persistence, and
suggests that modeling the former could be critical for a consistent estimation of the latter.
10Figure 2: The Fits of the HIP and RIP Models to the Empirical Age-Inequality Proﬁle of
Income



























































2.4 RIP versus HIP: Where Does Identiﬁcation Come From?
The problem of distinguishing between the RIP and HIP models is reminiscent of the
familiar debate in macroeconomics about whether GDP growth is better represented by
a stochastic trend (RIP model), or by stationary shocks around a deterministic trend (HIP
model). Given the well-known difﬁculties associated with distinguishing between those
two hypotheses (c.f., Christiano and Eichenbaum (1990)), it seems reasonable to suspect
a similar difﬁculty in the current context. Thus an important question to answer is the
following: Where does identiﬁcation between the RIP and HIP models come from?
The main difference between the present problem and the debate in macroeconomics
is that in our case we have access to panel data on labor income, unlike macroeconomists
who had to rely on a single time-series of GDP observations. With panel data, we can
characterize the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of income as a cohort gets
older. As we explain below, it then becomes possible to distinguish between the RIP and
HIP models by exploiting the different implications of each process for the evolution of
this cross-sectional distribution.
To see this clearly, consider the case where the panel data set contains income obser-
vations on a single cohort over time. Furthermore, suppose that income shocks have sta-
11tionary variances (φ2 = π2 ￿ 1).7 In this case, the second moments of the cross-sectional





































where we eliminated the subscript t, since time and age are perfectly correlated within
each cohort.
There are two sources of identiﬁcation, which can be seen by inspecting these for-
mulas. The ﬁrst piece of information is provided by the change in the cross-sectional
variance of income as the cohort ages, which is shown on the ﬁrst line of (5). The terms
in the square bracket capture the effect of proﬁle heterogeneity, which is a convex increas-
ing function of age. The second term captures the effect of the AR(1) shock, which is a
concave increasing function of age as long as ρ < 1. Thus, if the variance of income in the
data increases in a convex fashion as the cohort gets older, this would be captured by the
HIP terms (notice that the coefﬁcient on h2 is σ2
β), whereas a non-convex shape would
be captured by the presence of AR(1) shocks. Figure 2 (solid lines) plots the age-variance
proﬁle of income residuals for the whole population as well as for college and high-school
educated individuals separately. As can be seen here, the variance increases in a convex
fashion in all three cases suggesting a need for proﬁle heterogeneity.8 (We discuss other
aspects of this ﬁgure in the next section).
The second source of identiﬁcation is provided by the autocovariances displayed in
the second line. The covariance between ages h and h+n is again composed of two parts.
As before, the terms in the square bracket capture the effect of heterogeneous proﬁles
and is a convex function of age. Moreover, the coefﬁcients of the linear and quadratic
terms depend both on h and n, which allows covariances to be decreasing, increasing or
non-monotonic in the lag at each age. The second term captures the effect of the AR(1)
shock, and notice that for a given h, it depends on the covariance lag n only through the
7The expressions in (3) and (4) make clear how the time-effects πt and φt are identiﬁed: πt has a lasting
effect on subsequent covariances (that is, it shifts the entire covariance structure after date t) whereasφt only
affects the variance at time t. This implies however that the two time-effects are not separately identiﬁed at
the last date. To obtain identiﬁcation at T we make the assumption that π2
T￿1 = π2
T following Heathcote et
al. (2004).
8Of course AR(1) shocks can also generate a convex proﬁle if ρ > 1. But, as we discuss below, this would
imply that covariances increase with the lag order, which is grossly at odds with empirical evidence.
12Figure 3: The Covariance Structure of Income Residuals for College-Educated Individuals
























































geometric discounting termρn. The strong prediction of this form is that, starting at age h,
covariances should decay geometrically at the rateρ, regardless of the initial age. Thus, in
the RIP model (which only has the AR(1) component) covariances are restricted to decay
at the same rate at every age, and cannot be non-monotonic in n.
Figure 3 displays some representative elements of the empirical covariance matrix to







n = 0,1,..,25, and other lines plot the same for h = 27,29,...,45 (subject to h + n < 60).9
The key point to observe in this ﬁgure is that autocovariances are non-monotonic: they
are typically convex (U-shaped), ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing with the lag order.10
9To obtain this covariance matrix, we ﬁrst regressed the raw covariances on cohort dummies to eliminate
cohort effects. The covariances still contain the time-effects in variances, an issue that we address in the next
footnote.
10As mentioned in the previous footnote, we do not eliminate time-effects when constructiving these
covariances. However, note that the conclusions drawn about the shape of the covariance matrix in the
previous paragraph are independent of the presence of time effects. This is because the covariances given
in the second line of (5) would be exactly the same even if we do not restrict time effectsφ2 6= 1, and π2 6= 1
(compare the second lines of (3) and (5)). So the non-monotone shape of covariance structure cannot be
explained by appealing to non-stationary shock variances in the present RIP framework.
There is however, an alternative way to introduce time effects, proposed by Mofﬁtt and Gottschalk (1995),
where πt interacts with zit rather than with its innovations, ηit. This speciﬁcation in principle allows for
13Table 1: ESTIMATING THE PARAMETERS OF THE LABOR INCOME PROCESS





(1) A RIP .988 .058 — — .015 .061
(.024) (.011) (.007) (.010)
(2) A HIP .821 .022 .00038 ￿.23 .029 .047
(.030) (.074) (.00008) (.43) (.008) (.007)
(3) C RIP .979 .031 — — .0099 .047
(.055) (.021) (.013) (.020)
(4) C HIP .805 .023 .00049 ￿.70 .025 .032
(.061) (.112) (.00014) (1.22) (.015) (.017)
(5) H RIP .972 .053 — — .011 .052
(.023) (.015) (.007) (.008)
(6) H HIP .829 .038 .00020 ￿.25 .022 .034
(.029) (.081) (.00009) (.59) (.008) (.007)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. In the second column, A = all individuals, C = college-educated group,
and H = high school educated group. Time effects in the variances of persistent and transitory shocks are included
in the estimation in all rows, but are not reported to save space. The reported variances are averages over the sample
period.
Moreover, covariances do not appear to decay at the same rate regardless of age. Both of
these observations are consistent with the richer structure allowed by the HIP model, but
not with the more restrictive RIP model.
3 Empirical Findings
We ﬁrst estimate the parameters of the process (2) by ignoring individual-speciﬁc vari-
ation in income growth rates (σ2
β ￿ 0) but allowing for an individual ﬁxed-effect, αi
(RIP model). The ﬁrst row in Table 1 displays the results. The estimate of ρ is 0.988,
and one cannot statistically reject that income shocks are permanent at conventional sig-
niﬁcance levels. The innovation standard deviation of z is also large—about 12 percent
per year—so that in the long-run the persistent component dominates the cross-sectional
distribution of income.
Starting in the second row, we allow for heterogeneity in income growth rates (HIP
model). The ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that the estimated persistence falls from 0.988 to 0.82.
non-monotonicity in the covariance structure. We have re-estimated the HIP model with this alternative
parameterization yielding ρ = 0.78, and σ2
β = 0.00042, which is very similar results to our estimates from
the baseline model reported in the next section.
14Figure 4: The Remaining Effect of an AR(1) Shock for Different Values of ρ






































As is well-known, the difference between these two estimates is substantial (ﬁgure 4):
when ρ = 0.82, the effect of an income shock is reduced to fourteen percent of its initial
value in ten years, whereas for ρ = 0.988, it retains almost ninety percent of its initial
value at the same horizon. After twenty years, the effect of the former shock almost
vanishes whereas the latter shock still keeps eighty percent of its initial impact. As can be
anticipated from these comparisons, individuals facing each of these processes are likely
to make substantially different economic choices.
3.1 The labor income process by education group
We next examine if, and how, the labor income process differs by education group. This
question has so far only been investigated in the context of RIP models (Hubbard et al.,
1994, and Carroll and Samwick, 1997). Thus, to provide a benchmark, we begin by esti-
mating the RIP model for college- and high school-educated individuals. Rows 3 and 5 of
table 1 report the parameter estimates for the two groups. The estimated persistence para-
meters are 0.979 and 0.972 for the college- and high school educated-groups respectively.
Similarly, the innovation variances of the AR(1) shocks are 0.0099 and 0.0011 respectively.
Overall, the estimated parameters reveal remarkably similar income processes for the two
education groups.
Although this ﬁnding may seem surprising (given the many differences one could
think of between the labor market risks faced by different education groups), it is in fact
15consistent with the results obtained in previous studies. Table 2 displays the estimated in-
come processes from two studies that are most often used for calibrating macroeconomic
models. In Hubbard, et al. (1994), the estimated persistence ranges from 0.946 to 0.955
but shows no systematic pattern with education. The innovation variance seems to go
down with higher education, but the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Carroll and
Samwick (1997) impose the further restriction that income shocks are permanent for all
groups (ρ ￿ 1), and only estimate the variances. They ﬁnd innovation variances to be
increasing with education at lower levels, but then fall back at higher education levels.
The differences between groups are again not statistically signiﬁcant. They ﬁnd some ev-
idence that transitory shock variances get smaller with education. The conclusion that
emerges from these studies and our ﬁndings is that in the RIP model income risk does
not vary substantially by education level. If anything, there is some evidence that income
risk is somewhat greater for lower educated individuals.
Now we re-estimate the income process of each group allowing for HIP (rows 4 and
6 of Table 1). The estimated persistence is now signiﬁcantly lower for both groups (ρC =
0.81 versus ρH = 0.83), but there is still little difference across education groups. How-
ever, there is now a major difference in a key dimension: the dispersion of income proﬁles
is signiﬁcantly larger for college-educated individuals (σ2
β = .00049) compared to high
school-educated individuals (σ2
β = .00020). In fact, this difference could be partly antic-
ipated from ﬁgure 2, which shows a larger increase in within-cohort income inequality
among the former group than the latter group.
Figure 2 also shows how the estimated RIP and HIP models ﬁt the age-inequality
proﬁle of income for the sample of all individuals (left panel) as well as for college- and
high school-educated individuals (middle and right panels).11 It is clear that allowing
for heterogeneity in proﬁles helps the model better account for the slightly convex rise in
dispersion over the life-cycle. Although it is certainly true that the ﬁt of the RIP model
would improve with a higher estimated persistence parameter, notice that both models
are estimated to ﬁt all the elements of the covariance matrix, and not just the variances
plotted in the ﬁgure. A higher ρ results in a poorer ﬁt for the off-diagonal elements in the
RIP model, because these covariances show a steep decline as the lag order increases (see
ﬁgure 3).
11The age-inequality proﬁle is obtained by regressing the raw variances of each age-year cell, on age and
cohort dummies following Deaton and Paxson (1994), and the graphs plot the coefﬁcients on scaled age
dummies
16Table 2: ESTIMATES OF THE RIP MODEL BY EDUCATION LEVEL IN THE LITERATURE
Paper Group ρ σ2
η σ2
ε
Hubbard, Skinner, <12 yrs of education .955 .033 .040
and Zeldes (1994) (.106) (.076) (.075)
12-15 yrs of education .946 .025 .021
(.129) (.063) (.054)
16+ yrs of education .955 .016 .014
(.121) (.040) (.033)
Carroll and 0-8 grades 1.0y .0190 .0894
Samwick (1997) ￿ (.0137) (.0256)
9-12 grades 1.0 .0214 .0658
￿ (.0090) (.0168)
High school diploma 1.0 .0277 .0431
￿ (.0069) (.0129)
Some College 1.0 .0238 .0342
￿ (.0047) (.0088)
College graduates 1.0 .0146 .0385
￿ (.0068) (.0126)
Notes: One difference between these studies and ours is that these studies estimate income processes for household
income whereas we estimate for individuals. yThe persistence parameter is restricted to 1.0 (random walk shocks) in
Carroll and Samwick and hence is not estimated.
17Finally, the correlation between the slope and the intercept is negative in all rows
of Table 1 (although not precisely estimated), consistent with earlier work (Lillard and
Weiss, 1979; Hause, 1980; Baker, 1997). A natural interpretation for this negative corre-
lation is suggested by the human capital model: individuals who invest more early in
life—perhaps in response to higher learning ability—and suffer from lower income are
compensated by higher income growth. Moreover, the correlation is more negative for
the college-educated group (￿0.70) compared to the rest (￿0.25), suggesting that human
capital accumulation could be more important for wage growth in high-skill occupations
(Mincer, 1974; Hause, 1980).
3.2 Quantifying the heterogeneity in income proﬁles
The second main ﬁnding (in row 2 of Table 1) is that the heterogeneity in income growth
rates measured by σ2
β is (statistically) signiﬁcant. To show that this estimate is also eco-
nomically signiﬁcant, we rearrange the expression for cross-sectional income inequality

























from (4), and set πt and φt equal to 1.
This expression provides a useful decomposition of inequality into its components.
The ﬁrst parenthesis contains terms that do not depend on age (and hence make up the
intercept of the age-inequality proﬁle). The second parenthesis captures the rise in in-
equality due to the accumulated effect of AR(1) shocks. The solid line in the left panel
of ﬁgure 1 plots the magnitude of this term over the life-cycle of a cohort. For the esti-
mated value of b ρ = 0.82, this component increases slightly in the ﬁrst seven years and
then remains roughly constant.
The last parenthesis contains terms that capture the effect of HIP on inequality. It
consists of a decreasing linear term (since σαβ < 0), and an increasing quadratic term, in
h. It is easy to see that even when σ2
β is very small, the effect of proﬁle heterogeneity on
income inequality will grow rapidly with h2, as the cohort gets older. As the dashed line
in the left panel shows, early in the life-cycle the contribution of proﬁle heterogeneity to
income inequality is very small. In fact, until about age 47 more than half of the income
inequality is generated by the ﬁxed effect, and transitory and persistent shocks. However,
18Figure 5: Quantifying the Contribution of HIP to Income Inequality
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the effect of proﬁle heterogeneity increases rapidly with age, and results in substantial
inequality later in life.
The right panel of ﬁgure 5 plots the fraction of total inequality attributable to HIP. In
the sample of all individuals (denoted “-o”), HIP accounts for 79 percent of inequality at
retirement age. More importantly, HIP accounts for 81 percent of the inequality among
college-educated individuals (“-+”) and 64 percent of the inequality among high school-
educated individuals (“-x”).12 The fact that heterogeneity in income proﬁles is substantial
even within these education groups has an important implication for calibrating macro-
economic models. It suggests that the common practice of allowing for a different in-
come proﬁle for each education group, while omitting within-group variation, captures only
a small part of the proﬁle heterogeneity in the population.
12Notice that in the college sample the contribution of HIP to inequality is negative (i.e., HIP reduces
inequality) in the ﬁrst 10 years of the life-cycle. This is due to the large negative correlation (￿.70) between
the slope and intercept of income proﬁles in this group. As a result, early in life individuals with low initial
income but fast income growth catch up with those with slow income growth but high initial income, which
reduces inequality early on.
194 A Comparison to the Existing Literature
In this section we try to reconcile the direct estimation results of the previous section
supporting the HIP model with some previous tests used in the literature, which have
beeninterpretedassupportingtheRIPmodel(amongothers, MaCurdy, 1982; andAbowd
and Card, 1989).
The basic idea of these tests is based on the simple observation that with proﬁle het-
erogeneity, individual income growth should be positively autocorrelated. This can be
shown easily. From equation (2), the autocovariance of income growth at lag n is:
cov(￿yh
i ,￿yh+n














that arises from the
presence of HIP, and a negative term, which goes to zero as a geometric function of n.
According to the HIP model then covariances should be positive—after a certain lag—if
σ2
β is positive after all. Moreover, if ρ = 1 (income shocks are permanent) the negative
term disappears and autocovariances should always be positive at any lag greater than 1.
On the other hand, it is also easy to see that in the absence of HIP, autocovariances should
be either negative or zero (depending on whether ρ < 1 or ρ = 1). This suggests that one
way to distinguish between HIP and RIP models is to test if higher order autocovariances
are greater than zero.
The ﬁrst row of Table 3 reports the results of this test conducted in Topel (1990) using
PSID data covering 1968 ￿ 83. For completeness, the second row reports the same statis-
tics using our longer panel. The same pattern can be seen in both samples. Starting from
the second lag, there is no evidence of a positive covariance: they are all negative and
statistically not different from zero, which appears to cast doubt on the HIP model.13
There are two separate issues about the use of this test. The ﬁrst one is that the non-
rejection may be due to the low power of the test. To address this issue, consider the
case where the covariances are most likely to be positive, that is, when ρ = 1. But note
that while in this case covariances must be positive for all n ￿ 2, their magnitude is very
small (0.00038) making it difﬁcult to distinguish it from a value of zero implied by the
RIP model. Baker (1997) conducts a careful Monte Carlo analysis to examine the power
13The variance in Topel (1990) is about three times smaller than ours, probably because he looks at within-
job wage changes. MaCurdy (1982) and Baker (1997) report variances closer to ours.
20Table 3: THE COVARIANCE STRUCTURE OF INCOME GROWTH: A COMPARISON OF U.S.
DATA AND THE HIP MODEL
Lag
Sample 0 1 2 3 4 5
Autocovariance
(1) Data (Topel) .0476 ￿.0176 .00058 ￿.00166 ￿.00014 ￿.00067
(.0019) (.0014) (.0008) (.0007) (.0008) (.0007)
(2) Data (This paper) .1215 ￿.0385 ￿.0031 ￿.0023 ￿.0025 ￿.00004
(.0023) (.0011) (.0010) (.0008) (.0007) (.0008)
(3) Model .0840 ￿.0329 ￿.0014 ￿.0011 ￿.0007 ￿.0007
(.0013) (.0010) (.0008) (.0009) (.0008) (.0007)
Autocorrelation
(4) Data (Topel) 1.00 ￿.394 .013 ￿.039 ￿.003 ￿.016
(5) Data (This paper) 1.00 ￿.317 ￿.026 ￿.019 ￿.021 ￿.001
(6) Model 1.00 ￿.391 ￿.016 ￿.012 ￿.009 ￿.009
(.000) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.008) (.009)
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The statistics from Topel (1990) are from Table B1 in Appendix B, which
are calculated from PSID 1968-83 with 8683 observations. The counterparts from simulated data are calculated using
12,000 observations.
of this test, and concludes that it does not provide strong evidence against HIP. Thus, we
do not address this issue further in this paper.14
There is, however, a second concern about the use of this test, which is as critical as
the ﬁrst, and is independent of sample size. To see this point, recall that if in fact ρ < 1,
the second (negative) term is present, so the covariances are not positive up to a certain
lag. A key question then is the following: what is the lowest lag at which the covariances
should be expected to become positive? This is critical because all the studies mentioned
above have focused on the ﬁrst 5 to 10 lags. Figure 6 plots the autocovariances of income
growth for the ﬁrst 20 lags using our parameter estimates of the HIP model from Table 1.
For the sample of all individuals (denoted “-o”) autocovariances are negative up to the 12th
lag, simply becauseσ2
β is quantitatively so small compared to the term in brackets. Similar
calculations for individuals with college- and high school-education show that the covari-
ances become positive only at the 10th and 15th lags respectively. These calculations show
that the ﬁndings of negative autocovariances reported in MaCurdy (1982), Topel (1990)
14Notice that even though McCurdy (1982)’s test cannot distinguish the autocovariances from zero, we
are able to get statistically signiﬁcant estimates of proﬁle heterogeneity. The reason is that taking the aver-
ages of ﬁrst order autocorrelations results in the loss of useful information. Instead we exploit the informa-
tion in the entire variance covariance matrix which yields more precise information.
21Figure 6: Evaluating MaCurdy’s Test: The Covariance Structure of Income Growth



































and Topel and Ward (1992) is exactly what is implied by the HIP model. Notice that this
issue is separate from the power of the test, and suggests that even if an econometrician
had access to a very large data set, the signs of these lower order covariances are not
informative about HIP.
We conduct a Monte Carlo exercise to further explore this issue. We simulate income
paths using the HIP model and the parameter values from the second row of Table 1.15
The third row in Table 3 displays the averages of autocovariances over 500 replications
along with the standard errors of the sampling distribution. The higher order covariances
are negative, close to zero, and statistically insigniﬁcant after the second lag, similar to
their empirical counterparts. Similarly, Panel B displays the autocorrelation structure of
income changes using simulated data along with its empirical counterpart. Again, the
same pattern is apparent here: very weak negative autocorrelations, not signiﬁcant after
the ﬁrst lag. Overall, these results suggest that tests based on the sign of covariances do
not provide conclusive evidence on proﬁle heterogeneity. The HIP model generates the
same negative autocovariance structure that was previously used to reject it.
Finally, a similar concern applies to the variant of this test implemented by Abowd
15We ﬁrst simulated income paths for 500,000 individuals. Then we drew 12,000 pairs of observations
(￿yh
i , ￿yh+k
i ) without replacement for randomly selected initial age, h, and k = 1,..11. The ﬁrst ten autoco-
variances of income changes are then calculated using this sample and the exercise is repeated 500 times.
22and Card (1989). As an extension to MaCurdy’s idea, these authors proposed to test
if all higher order autocovariances are jointly equal to zero. The test essentially entails
computing a weighted sum of squared autocovariances from lags 2 to 10, and comparing it
to the corresponding critical value from the χ2 distribution. However, as shown in ﬁgure
6 the deviations of autocovariances from zero (between lags 2 and 10) are due to the AR(1)
component, and is in negative direction, rather than being due to HIP and in the positive
direction. But because covariances are squared, the test does not distinguish between
negative and positive deviations. Therefore, with a large enough sample, Abowd and
Card’s test would reject the null of zero even when the income process contains only an
AR(1) component and there was no proﬁle heterogeneity.16 In other words, the rejection
of the null hypothesis would not necessarily support the HIP model either. Thus, the
interpretation of the results of this test is not straightforward when the data generating
process has an AR(1) component. This is true regardless of sample size.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examined labor income data to distinguish between the RIP and HIP
models. The existing evidence from labor income data has commonly been interpreted
by macroeconomists as strongly in favor of the RIP model. Consequently, almost all life-
cycle (or overlapping generations) models in the literature are calibrated using the RIP
model as the income process.
We ﬁrst argued that imposing a priori restrictions on income proﬁles as is done in the
RIP model introduces an upward bias into the estimated persistence if the true data gen-
erating process features heterogeneous proﬁles. When we allow for HIP, the estimates we
obtained indicate substantial heterogeneity in income proﬁles, and income shocks with
modest persistence. Second, we also show that the HIP process we estimate generates
small and negative autocovariances, quantitatively similar to their empirical counterpart,
casing doubt on the previous interpretation of this ﬁnding as supporting the RIP model.
The HIP model also implies that the income processes of high and low educated indi-
viduals differ in a key dimension: the dispersion of income growth rates is much larger
for the former group than the latter. This is in contrast to the RIP model which indi-
16In fact in this case the null would be rejected more easily because the covariance structure would shift
downward making the lower order covariances more negative (and hence their squared value farther away
from zero)
23cates similar income processes for both groups (or more uncertainty for the latter group).
This ﬁnding has potentially important implications for life-cycle studies which attempt to
understand certain differences in economic behavior among education groups. Existing
studies have used the RIP model as the income process, which often implies puzzling dif-
ferences in behavior by education level (see for example, Hubbard, et al., 1994; and Davis,
Kubler and Willen, 2002).
It is important not to interpret these results—especially the low persistence of shocks
in the HIP model—as suggesting that income uncertainty is not as large as that implied
by the RIP model. The statistical analysis we conducted reveals an important systematic
component by examining realized (ex post) wages, but is silent about whether (or how
much) each individual knows about his own proﬁle ex ante. The latter cannot be deter-
mined by examining labor income data alone, though it could in principle be inferred by
studying the choices made by individuals. In Guvenen (2005) we conduct such an analy-
sis and argue that in fact a substantial part of this systematic variation is unknown to
individuals early on, and is revealed very slowly, implying that the HIP model also fea-
tures substantial income uncertainty. However, the nature of this risk and its distribution
over the life-cycle is different than in the RIP model.
A Data Appendix
Thedataaredrawnfromtheﬁrst26wavesofthePSID.Weincludeanindividualintooursampleif
he satisﬁes the following criteria for a total of twenty years between 1968 and 1993. The individual
(i) is a male head of household
(ii) is between 22 and 62 years old (inclusive)
(iii) is not from the SEO sample (which oversamples poor households)
(iv) has positive hours and labor income
(v) has hourly labor earnings more than Wmin and less than Wmax , where we set Wmin to $2
and Wmax to $400 in 1993 and adjust them for previous years using the average growth rate of
nominal wages obtained from BLS,
(vi) worked for more than 520 hours (10 hours per week) and less than 5110 hours (14 hours a
day, everyday)
There were a total of 1270 individuals satisfying these conditions for at least twenty years
who comprise the primary sample. Among these individuals 53 of them report a change in their
educationstatusduringthesampleperiod. Weexcludetheseindividualsfromthetwosubsamples
deﬁned by education used in Section 3.1.
Variable Deﬁnitions
Age of the head is constructed by taking the ﬁrst report of age by the individual and by adding
thenecessarynumberofyearstoobtaintheageinotheryears(variablenameV16631in1989). This
24is done to eliminate the occasional non-changes or two-year jumps in the age variable between
consecutive interviews as a result of interviews not being conducted exactly one year apart.
Head’s total labor income measure is comprehensive and includes salary income, bonuses, over-
time, commissions, and the labor part of farm, business, market gardening, and roomers and
boarders income, as well as income from professional practice or trade (variable name V17534 in
1989).
Annual labor hours of the head is the self-reported annual hours worked by the individual
(variable name V16335 in 1989).
Head’s average hourly earnings is calculated by the PSID as the ratio of total labor income to
annual labor hours (variable name V17536 in 1989).
Education is based on the categorical education variable in the years it is available (variable
name V17545 in 1989), and on years of schooling completed when this variable was not available
(variable name V30620 in 1989). Potential labor market experience is constructed from this latter
variable.
Thetraditionalapproachtopanelconstruction(LillardandWeiss, 1979; MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd
and Card, 1989; and Baker, 1997, among others) requires an individual to satisfy the selection cri-
teria for every year of the sample period to be included in the panel. Although this condition
has the advantage of creating a balanced panel, it also has the drawback of reducing the sample
size signiﬁcantly as the time horizon expands, since individuals with even one year of missing
data are excluded. We also require the individuals to be present in the sample for a long period
of time while allowing for up to six missing observations for each individual. This is intended
to make our panel construction comparable to earlier studies, while at the same time keeping a
reasonably large number of observations. An alternative approach pursued by some recent stud-
ies is to include an individual into the panel if certain criteria are satisﬁed for a few—usually
two or three—years (Haider (2001); Storesletten et al. (2004)). Haider’s estimates from the HIP
speciﬁcation are similar to ours (in particular, ρ = 0.64, andσ2
β = 0.00041).
Table A1 reports some summary statistics for the primary sample.
B The Estimation Method
This appendix describes the minimum distance estimation (MDE) of the parameters of the income
process given in equation (2). Let cn be a typical element of the covariance matrix C of the in-
come residuals, where n = 1,.., N (= T (T + 1)=2) enumerates unique elements of this matrix,
and let dn (Xi,b) denote the corresponding model covariances given by equation (3), where b de-
note the parameters of the income process. Deﬁne Fn (b, Xi,￿in) = ￿in [cn ￿ dn (Xi,b)], where
￿in is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if individual i contributes to moment condition n,
and zero otherwise. Finally, stack all moment conditions into an (N ￿ 1) vector: F(b, Xi,￿i) ￿
[F1 (b, Xi,￿i1),..., FN (b, Xi,￿iN)]
0, where ￿i is the indicator functions stacked into a vector con-
formably to F. The moment conditions that we are estimating are of the form:
Ei [F(b, Xi,￿i)] = 0.


















25where e AN is a positive deﬁnite matrix. Chamberlain (1984) discusses the choice of the asymp-
totically optimal weighting matrix. However, Altonji and Segal (1996) provide Monte Carlo ev-
idence showing that the optimal weighting matrix often results in substantial small sample bias
and recommend the use of an identity matrix instead, and we follow their recommendation. No-
tice however that because the panel is not balanced, each moment in the vector F is calculated
using a different number of observations (determined by the non-zero elements of ￿in). To adjust
for this difference, we set e AN ￿ ANAN, where AN is a diagonal matrix with element (I=In) at
the nth diagonal, where In is obtained by summing ￿in over i. This choice implies that each mo-
ment is calculated using all available observations and the resulting moments are weighted with
an identity matrix.
Finally, the estimator b bN is consistent, asymptotically Normal with an asymptotic covari-
ance matrix ￿ ￿ (D0D)
￿1 D0￿D(D0D)
￿1 , where D is the Jacobian of the vector of moments,
E[¶F(b, Xi,￿i)=¶b0], and ￿ is the covariance matrix E[F(b, Xi,￿i)F(b, Xi,￿i)0]. Both expecta-
tions are replaced by sample averages when implemented.
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